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### How Will the North Atlantic Pact Affect Us?

A radio discussion over WGN and the Mutual Broadcasting System

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
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Broadcast continuously since 1934 by Northwestern University



**THE REVIEWING STAND** is a weekly radio forum presented by Northwestern University. The program was first broadcast by Station WGN, Chicago, October 14, 1934. It has been on the air continuously since that time, originating in the WGN studios, and, since 1935, carried by the stations of the Mutual Broadcasting System. THE REVIEWING STAND presents members of the Northwestern University faculty and distinguished guests from business, government, education, and the press in round table discussions of contemporary problems—the questions that are in the news. The program is under the direction of James H. McBurney, Dean of the School of Speech, Northwestern University; Miss Myrtle Stahl, Director of Educational Programs, WGN, Chicago; R. E. Buchanan, Public Relations Director of Radio, Northwestern University.

The Northwestern University Reviewing Stand, published weekly beginning May 2, 1943, by the Offices of the Director of Radio (Public Relations), Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. Entered as second class matter at the Post Office, Evanston, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1875. Subscription price, \$1.00 for 16 weeks, \$2.00 for 32 weeks, \$2.50 for one year. Single copies, ten cents.

# How Will the North Atlantic Pact Affect Us?

**ANNOUNCER:** The Northwestern University Reviewing Stand!

**MR. BUCHANAN:** How will the North Atlantic Pact affect us?

**MR. BARBER:** The North Atlantic Pact will be a long step toward the establishment of peace and security in our time.

**MR. SCHILPP:** The North Atlantic Pact is as certain a step to World War III as Lend Lease proved to be a long step toward World War II.

\* \* \* \*

**MR. BUCHANAN:** All this week Congress has been wrestling with the problem of approval or refusal of the North Atlantic Pact. Some Congressmen say the pact is a vital foundation of our foreign policy and a great step toward peace. Others claim that the agreement might merely arm Europe and lead to another war.

To discuss this problem of the pact and our foreign relations, the Reviewing Stand today welcomes Hollis W. Barber, associate professor of political science at the University of Illinois, Chicago Division, who has just returned from a conference on the Atlantic Pact here in Illinois; and Paul A. Schilpp, associate professor of philosophy at Northwestern University, who had a chance to observe Europe firsthand recently as both a teacher in Germany and as a delegate to the second World Congress on World Government in Luxembourg.

## Toward Peace or War?

Mr. Barber, you seem to think this pact will be a step toward peace. Why do you think it might lead us in this direction?

**MR. BARBER:** I think it is going to be a step toward peace for the reasons

stated in the Vandenberg resolution a year and a half ago and in the treaty itself. I think that if any possible aggressor knows in advance that he is going to be met with overwhelming force, I just don't think he is going to do any aggressing.

**MR. BUCHANAN:** Mr. Schilpp, you have already pointed out that you would disagree. Why do you think this Pact is going to lead toward another war?

**MR. SCHILPP:** In the first place, it is a defensive alliance; in the second place, it continues the balance of power idea; in the third place, it is the formation of a bloc against another bloc; in the fourth place, it will create the worst armament race in history; in the fifth place, it by-passes the United Nations and therefore shows our lack of confidence in the UN; in the sixth place, it interferes with the constructive work of the European Recovery Program; and in the seventh place, Congress abdicates its constitutional right to declare war.

For all these seven reasons, it seems to me that the North Atlantic Pact leads to war and not to peace.

## History of Pact

**MR. BUCHANAN:** The positions are now clear, but I am not clear about who started this Pact. What was its original nature and its original purpose?

**MR. BARBER:** That is kind of a hen-and-egg proposition. I don't know exactly where the thing started. I don't think it started with any one individual. One of the bases for it was the inter-American system, the Rio Pact, particularly of a year or two ago—the idea that the Americas would stand together against an aggressor.

Another was the Brussels Pact of early 1948 in which the Benelux countries agreed to unite to resist aggression. Those are some of the basic things, I think, which led to the formation of the Pact. I don't think any one person drafted the Pact as it stands. It was a joint proposition. It was hammered out in a lot of long negotiations. We proposed some things at first, which certain countries were not willing to accept. They proposed some things we couldn't accept.

As to the commitments that we should automatically go to war, it is important to remember that one of the original drafts of the Pact called for automatic aid to those who were the victims of aggression. We weren't willing to accept that. We put an escape valve or escape clause in the treaty. We used these words, "take such action as it deems necessary." It is not an automatic commitment in that sense. It is not automatic.

### What Is Called For?

MR. SCHILPP: But it says, "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." In other words, it is clear that, when the Pact is finally and officially ratified, the individual signers and signatories of the Pact will be forced to manifest force if that is the situation which seems to be called for.

MR. BARBER: Yes, if that is the situation we think is called for. It is still not an automatic commitment. I think that is definite. We might take military action; we might take economic action. There are all sorts of things we could do. I don't think we are committed to an automatic declaration of war the minute somebody marches into, say, Luxembourg.

MR. SCHILPP: Yet, all the argument in Congress this past week has been precisely over that issue!

No matter how much Senator Dulles, Senator Connally, and some of the others who have been leading the fight

for the Pact have been trying to assure men like Senator Taft and others that the Pact does not mean an automatic commitment, the wording is this in Article 3: ". . . by means of continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." The fact that the Pact is intended immediately to bring an appropriation to arm these European countries so that they will be ready to resist attack indicates that this escape clause is not really an escape clause.

MR. BARBER: That may be a legal argument. I think a great deal of the time has been spent in arguing this thing legally—which is simply shadowboxing and not much more—as to whether this is a legal commitment or a moral commitment. I don't think there is a moral commitment among nations, because a legal commitment or obligation implies, at least in domestic law, something that can be enforced by a court, sheriff, or bailiff. You don't have that enforcement between nations.

As far as that business of going to war is concerned, it has been debated any number of times—I don't know how many hours. The question is whether Congress abdicates its power to declare war, if we sign and ratify this treaty.

### Declaration of War

Whether there is any Atlantic Pact or not—let's assume there is no Pact, we never heard of it—there is still a good possibility that the President might take direct military action, which, on the basis of advice available to him and in his judgment, he thought was in the interest of American security to take.

What I am getting at is this: Congress has the power to declare war under the Constitution, of course. Under the Constitution the President is commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, and I emphasize commander-in-chief. He is the one who gives the

orders. It doesn't make any difference whether there is war or peace. There have been—I don't know how many times—perhaps 100 times in the course of 150 or 160 years when the President ordered troops into foreign territory.

MR. BUCHANAN: You mean the President could take immediate military action?

MR. BARBER: That is right, whether there is any alliance or not. I don't think the Pact has much to do with that fact. The Pact reinforces this idea; it starts nothing new.

MR. SCHILPP: I am perfectly willing to grant you this last point. But, I don't think the argument changes the fundamental proposition.

Before I go on, Mr. Buchanan, I think it is important to state clearly that I am not an isolationist; neither am I a war monger. I do not believe in this slogan: "Is this a private fight or may anybody butt in?" That seems to have been the attitude too many times in the past.

### Lessons from History

If history has proved anything at all—and I realize, of course, that history probably proves only that men learn no lessons from history — it would seem to prove that the greatest fraud ever perpetrated on the human race was the old Roman proverb, "If you want peace, prepare for war!" Every nation which prepared for war, through the centuries, got what it prepared for, namely, war not peace! Yet we have learned no lesson from this obvious fact of history. We keep right on preparing for war and selling to our people the tremendous costs of war preparation under the same old, worn-out, and a-hundred-times-disproved slogans and pretext—that it is all done in the interest of preserving peace.

The old saying that you can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, needs today to be revised to read: "You can fool most of the people most of the time."

MR. BARBER: Mr. Schilpp defends himself in an implied attack that he is an isolationist and I am glad to hear that he is not. We are both internationalists, although we think that each of us has the better way of solving the problem. Neither of us is an isolationist. Let's assume that. You say there was an implied criticism that you were an isolationist. That is clear. I think, then, you imply a criticism that I am a war monger.

MR. SCHILPP: Not necessarily.

MR. BARBER: I think there was as much implication one way or the other.

I am no war monger. I do not know just what a war monger is but I am sure I am not such a creature.

### Security and Defense

The whole point, as far as I am concerned, in this North Atlantic Pact and particularly in the implementation of the Pact, is that it is a security pact. I think it is a defense pact. I think it is an alliance which has a good chance of preserving the peace. I am not guaranteeing it. There is no gold bond guarantee on this thing, but I think there is a good chance that it is going to preserve the peace.

I want to take exception to this thing you talk about: the historical inevitability that since things have gone one way in the past they are necessarily going that way in the future. I am not prepared to admit that men and women are simply cogs in a machine, that there is something absolutely mechanical about history. It is a question of: Are we mice or men? Remember, Groucho Marx once answered, "Put a piece of cheese in front of me and see." It isn't that simple, however. I am not prepared to admit that we are simply caught in that machine. The fact that alliances have led to war in the past is perfectly true. I don't deny that. But, I am prepared to deny that such is necessarily the case in the future. The important thing, it seems to me, is the spirit in which we carry out this Pact.

MR. BUCHANAN: I want to be specific now that we have set some of the background. Mr. Schilpp, you say it is a defensive pact and therefore you disapprove. Mr. Barber says the defense pact is what we need. What do you have against a defensive pact, Mr. Schilpp?

MR. SCHILPP: It is, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Barber, a defensive alliance. There are just two things wrong with that phrase: the first word, *defensive*, and the second word, *alliance*.

No modern nation has ever admitted fighting in or preparing for an offensive war, which means that every one claims to be preparing for war in mere and sheer self-defense. Hitler claimed to have fought in self-defense, or at least sold this idea to the German people.

### What about Alliances?

In reference to the second word, every modern alliance has been erected in the name of self-defense—Triple-Entente, Triple-Alliance before World War I; Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, the "Allies."

MR. BARBER: I am prepared to argue that defensive alliance proposition. I think it *is* defensive.

You referred to Hitler a minute ago. Of course, you are perfectly correct in what you say. Nobody denies he was an aggressor. But Hitler made some demand, marched up to the border and said, "I want so and so. If you don't give it to me, if you take action against me, then *you* are the aggressor. *You* started the war." He shifted the burden.

Here the question is: Who is doing the defending and who is doing the aggressing? It has been perfectly clear since 1945 that the Soviet Union maintains its armed forces at war time strength, or nearly so. Russia has discharged some of the young kids and old men, but the country has three to five million under arms. Yet, we have demobilized, and so have the western countries in Europe. There has been that military or armament

angle which, I think, is an aggressive proposition. Stalin, or the Russians in general, in the last three or four years has taken over Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. We haven't seized these countries. I think we are defending ourselves against aggression that is already started!

### 'Gives Russia Opportunity'

MR. SCHILPP: I am not taking issue with your facts on Russia. Let's be perfectly clear on that. But I am simply saying that we are, by creating this North Atlantic Pact, giving Russia a chance to do in the open what at least up until now she has done more or less undercover. The bloc she has created has been created surreptitiously by working within countries. Later the countries affiliate with the Russians. From now on, we have made an open bloc against her and her allies, and Russia will be able to do exactly the same thing. It is the old story—to use your own phraseology of a little while ago—of the hen and the egg. Which came first?

MR. BARBER: As far as the hen and the egg, that was the hen as far as aggression is concerned and it is perfectly clear about Russia taking over. I don't see why you consider it surreptitious. There was nothing surreptitious about taking Czechoslovakia—I think that was open enough! I think the hen was in that case the Russian aggressor. I think the egg is, or was, a hope that the United Nations, in operating under Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter, would preserve peace.

MR. SCHILPP: You are forgetting your own analogy about the hen and the egg. I realize that we wouldn't have a hen unless there had been an egg first, which is precisely the old question: "Which *did* come first? This no one has ever answered, so the analogy does not hold. I think in this instance the answer is perfectly clear and simple.

You, Mr. Buchanan, ask the question, "How will the Pact affect us?"

It will involve the United States in the greatest and most intense armament race in the history of the world. We are already arming ourselves to the teeth, to the tune of billions of dollars annually, and actually without the Pact. Now we are to add \$1,300,000,000 for the first year in terms of implementation of the North Atlantic Pact requirements. Only yesterday we heard the announcements about the expensive research and work on a secret underwater weapon in connection with submarines. This indicates in which direction we are going!

### 'Arm Other Nations'

But under this Pact, all of this is not enough. We are planning, under this Pact, to arm more than a dozen other nations besides!

MR. BUCHANAN: I think that is a vital point. Are we to arm Europe as some critics say, or don't you think that enters the argument?

MR. BARBER: We are to arm Europe. That is the text of the Pact, which indicates such armament as a logical consequence. The State Department has not tried to hide that at all. That has gone before Congress.

MR. BUCHANAN: What do you mean—we will arm Europe? What does that consist of?

MR. BARBER: That means a good many things: training of some of their military men; transferring to them some military equipment. In the first instance, such transfer will be some of our surplus stocks. In the future, I don't know that anybody can say with any degree of accuracy what such arming is going to mean. I presume a continuation of that sort of thing for maybe three, four, or five years.

MR. BUCHANAN: You think that is justified?

MR. BARBER: I do.

MR. SCHILPP: It is justified not for three, four, or five years, but 20 years!

MR. BARBER: Yes, that is right. It is

a 20-year pact. That does not mean necessarily that all the activity under the agreement is going to continue for twenty years. This thing, as I see it, is a stopgap proposition. We tried and hoped that the United Nations would be able to settle some of these difficulties. That hasn't panned out. Part of that is, of course, because of the Russian veto in the Security Council and the attitude taken by them in the military staff committee set up for regulation of armaments and some international police force. We tried in good faith, but that machinery hasn't worked, so we are trying another attack. I don't think we are going outside the United Nations. We are bolstering a spot where the United Nations has shown itself, I am sorry to say, to be weak.

MR. SCHILPP: That is exactly the point. I am glad at least it is your admission. The Atlantic Pact indicates we believe at this particular point that the United Nations has failed. This shows that the government at this point has no faith, no confidence, no trust that the United Nations or its decisions will be implemented.

### By-Passing UN

On this whole question of by-passing the United Nations with other alliances, I should like, instead of quoting just my own ideas, to quote the Secretary General of the United Nations. As long ago as February 11 he stated: "If people generally began to accept alliances as a substitute for genuine world-wide collective security, then the hope of a lasting peace would be gravely endangered."

It seems to me that makes the point precise.

MR. BARBER: It comes close to the point that I was making a while ago. I said a while ago that I think the important thing is not the Pact itself but the spirit in which it is carried out, the implementation. If this is a pact, or turns out to be a pact, which leads to another pact, and a series of

pacts so that the United Nations is completely forgotten, then the jig is up. You are right there.

This isn't a matter of admitting that the United Nations has failed. This is really to be a part of the United Nations. Let's not forget the Trusteeship Council and the Security Council, which are very important factors of the United Nations that have worked so far and give good promise of working well in the future.

I look at this pact in the same way as you look at a spare tire you carry in your automobile. It doesn't weaken your car to carry a spare tire. You know you may have a puncture sometime. When you do that, you are going to get out your spare tire and replace the punctured tire. That is what we are doing here.

MR. SCHILPP: Your analogy is awfully weak. I have never yet seen a spare tire jump out of a car and start to make trouble. It is pulled out when you need it, and it is not the sort of thing that creates punctures, whereas military alliances have created one puncture after another in history. The proposition of assuming that you can compare the North Atlantic Pact to a spare tire is the notion that a spare tire is a passive thing which doesn't create any friction. Everyone knows that this Pact is creating friction because it calls for the formation of blocs. I have already admitted there was a bloc formed surreptitiously on the other side. Now it gives the opponent a chance to work more openly.

### 'Pact Is Safeguard'

MR. BARBER: A bloc is being formed all right! Blocs have been formed before. That has nothing to do with this thing. There is a Russian bloc for that matter. It has shown up in the General Assembly. Look at the votes in the assembly—42 to 6. Six are always the same—the Soviet Union and its satellites. There have been Latin-American blocs, Arab blocs, and so on. Those weren't started by the Atlantic Pact. They weren't started

by the United Nations. They go beyond that.

We have tried some machinery and it didn't work out as well as we hoped it would. Now we are going to try another bit of machinery, but we are not saying that we will cast aside the first one. We are going to use the Pact as a temporary crutch to help us out of a jam.

### European Recovery Program

MR. BUCHANAN: You speak of machinery. Mr. Schilpp believes that the Pact might interfere with the machinery already in motion, namely, the European Recovery Program.

MR. SCHILPP: Yes, the North Atlantic Pact will interfere with the constructive work which the European Recovery Program is doing on the economic side. It cannot help but do so, because it is diverting men, money, and strategic materials necessary for the European Recovery to military purposes, thereby defeating the very program of helping Europe to get back on its feet and to be able to take care of itself even in the case of attack. Obviously, countries which are economically bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy are of no particular significance in point of war.

MR. BARBER: That is perfectly right. A bankrupt country is no good as a military ally, but that situation depends on economic power. In reference to European recovery, I think there are two things to be said:

In the first place, it has been perfectly and clearly announced, honestly announced, by the Secretary of State and others in our country, that any military assistance to be given under this pact is going to be subordinated to the Marshall Plan, which serves primarily for economic reconstruction rather than military reconstruction. Economic reconstruction comes first.

And the second answer to this objection that the Pact will impede recovery: The Pact is intended to be a shot in the arm for European morale. We want people in Europe to be able

to say, "We are safe. We can invest our money and build our factories. We can go back to work again."

### Cost of War

MR. SCHILPP: It is strange to hear you say the Pact is a shot in the arm to Europe. When you start building up military alliances and defense pacts, looking toward another World War, the surest way to wreck the economy of any country is to increase the military appropriations out of proportion to the remainder of the life of the country. After all, we have the whole history of humanity and all nations in the past to prove that point. Yet, at the present time—when we know that just about 80 cents of the federal dollar is being expended in this country for war, past, present and future—we are trying to impose more or less the same sort of thing upon eleven European countries and to wreck the entire economic program of all the nations!

MR. BARBER: I don't think we are *imposing* anything on the European countries. I would object violently to

that word! I think this is a thing which the Europeans—those who have come under the Pact—want. I don't think we are imposing anything on them at all.

As far as the amount of money that is spent for war, I deplore that too. I don't like to think of paying 80 cents out of the dollar for war. On the other hand, I don't see what we can do about it in light of the present situation. We can't rebuild the whole house. We have to make some alterations.

### 'What Can We Do?'

MR. SCHILPP: We could build a World Government and give to that World Government the necessary military force on the basis of an all-world proposition and eliminate the very situation which this Pact creates.

MR. BARBER: You are talking about World Government. I am all for you on that. As far as I am concerned, that is probably the best idea of the 21st century. However, we are certainly not ready yet!



## Suggested Readings



Compiled by Laura R. Joost, Assistant,  
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*The North Atlantic Treaty*, debate in the House of Commons, excerpts from the speeches of Mr. Bevin, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Davies, Mr. Zilliacus, and Mr. Noel-Baker, May 12, 1949. New York, British Information Services, 1949.

Opinions of several British statesmen expressed in debate of the North Atlantic Treaty.

U.S. Department of State. Division of Publications. Office of Public Affairs. *North Atlantic Treaty*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. (General Foreign Policy Series, No. 8, 5c)

Official text of the North Atlantic Treaty.

WARBURG, JAMES P. *The North Atlantic Defense Pact and the Proposal to Rearm Western Europe*. An address to United World Federalists on March 10, 1949.

A critical examination and a proposal for the modification of the Pact.

WARBURG, JAMES P. *North Atlantic Security Program*: Statement to the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 10, 1949.

Points out some of the dangers involved in the North Atlantic Pact.

Academy of Political Science. *Proceedings*. 23:312-23, May, '49. "The Atlantic Community and the United Nations." P. C. JESSUP.

Analyzes and discusses the North Atlantic Pact in the light of the U.N. Charter, the policy of the U.S. as expressed by the President and the Secretary of State, and the manner in which the North Atlantic Pact can be used.

*Christian Century* 66:702-3, June 8, '49. "Questions for the Senate."

Six specific points in regard to articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Pact.

*Congressional Digest* 28:182-41, June-July, '49. "Is the North Atlantic Pact a Sound Plan for U.S. Security?" Pro and Con Discussion.

Principal arguments for and doubts concerning the Pact.

*Congressional Digest* 28:99-100, Apr., '49; *Current History*, ns 16:295-6, May, '49; *Vital Speeches* 15:354-5, Apr. 1, '49; same with discussion—U.S. State Department Bulletin 20:339-50, Mar. 20, '49. "Text of North Atlantic Treaty."

*Debater's Digest* 23:nos. 2 & 3, Feb. & Mar., '49. "Should We Ratify the North Atlantic Pact?"

Affirmative and negative briefs on the question—Resolved: That the Senate of the United States should ratify the North Atlantic Alliance.

*Foreign Policy Report* 24:226-32, Feb. 15, '49. "North Atlantic Defense Pact." V. M. DEAN and B. BOLLES.

Development and background of the North Atlantic Defense Pact with a brief pro and con discussion.

*International Organization* 3:239-51, May, '49. "The Atlantic Pact and International Security." GRAYSON KIRK.

A searching discussion of the Atlantic Pact and its influence on the United Nations and world peace. The author believes that the Pact will make worse U.S. relations with Russia and weaken the United Nations.

*Life* 26:44, Apr. 11, '49. "Atlantic Alliance."

States the possible meaning of the Atlantic Pact to Americans, to Western Europeans, and to the Russians.

*Newsweek* 33:23, May 2, '49. "Military Aid and the Pact." E. K. LINDLEY

Notes on opposition to the Atlantic Defense Pact and on the military-aid program of the Pact.

*Saturday Evening Post* 221:10, May 7, '49. "Defense Pact Can Kill U.N. Charter or Put Life in It."

An editorial which marks the Atlantic Charter Defense Pact as an evader of the U.N. Charter and one which will kill it unless the Charter is amended to conform to the provisions in the Pact.

*Soviet Russia Today* p. 9+, Apr., '49. "A Soviet View of the North Atlantic Pact." BORIS LEONTYEV.

*United Nations Bulletin* 6:410-15, May 1, '49. "For and Against the North Atlantic Treaty; Excerpts from Discussion at Plenary Meetings of United Nations Assembly."

U.S.S.R. and satellites denounce North Atlantic Treaty and signees defend their action.

*U.S. News* 26:24-5, Apr. 22, '49. "Russian View: Why Soviet Believes Atlantic Pact Threatens 'people's democracies'; U.S. View: Mr. Truman's Declaration that West Must Halt Destruction of Freedoms." (Text of President's message submitting North Atlantic Treaty to Senate, April 12, 1949 included).

*U.S. State Department Bulletin* 20: 594-9, May 8, '49. "North Atlantic Treaty and the Role of the Military Assistance Program." D. G. ACHESON.

Its goal: preservation of peace at home and abroad, contribution toward world-wide security.

*Vital Speeches* 15:393-4, Apr. 15, '49. "Military Security Significance of Atlantic Pact." O. N. BRADLEY.

An argument for the military aid agreement included in the Atlantic Pact.

*Yale Review* 38:577-587, Summer '49. "Washington and the Atlantic Pact." M. W. CHILDS.

Attempts to answer some of the doubts raised in government circles concerning the North Atlantic Pact.

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
## The United Nations and the Cold War

Vol. XI, No. 16

## Is World Government Possible Now?

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